Marquette Law Review
Volume 41
Issue 1 Summer 1957

Article 3

Illegal Performance of a Legal Contract
Cornelius C. Shields

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Cornelius C. Shields, Illegal Performance of a Legal Contract, 41 Marq. L. Rev. 34 (1957).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol41/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

COMMENTS
ILLEGAL PERFORMANCE OF A LEGAL CONTRACT
I. INTRODUCTION

In a system of law which proceeds initially, as does the common
law, from the particular facts of each individual case, absolute and universally applicable principles which do not admit of exception or qualification are not frequently established. It is surprising, therefore, to
find, in the complex area of illegal contracts, the uncompromising
statement that "if an agreement can by its terms be performed lawfully, it will be treated as legal, even if performed in an illegal manner,' ' 1 or, rephrased, "if the contract itself discloses no illegality and
may be performed in a legal manner, it is not rendered unenforceable
by the fact that it may also be, or is actually, performed in an illegal
manner."'2 An array of cases may be found cited as authority for this
rule," 3 which shall be referred to hereafter as the "broad rule." But
nonetheless a decision such as that reached in a recent New York case'
in which an agent performed his contract by committing the crime of
bribery gives occasion to pause, because the result of applying the
"broad rule" was enforcement of the contract and recovery of fees
to the amount of thousands of dollars by the agent. There is a certain
obvious truth in the statement of a Virginia court, "It is clear that one
cannot come into court and say, 'I have done an evil thing for you,
pay me for it.' "5 The obvious force of this statement and the discordant note of the New York decision lead one to suspect that the true
legal principle is not quite so univocal. This article shall trace the development of the "broad rule" and show that, in truth, it is not without
serious qualification and, when correctly applied, does not lead to decisions at variance with common notions of morality.
The rule is not expressed in exactly the same language in all the
cdses and secondary authorities, some stating that a legal contract
is not "rendered unenforceable" by illegal performance, others that
1 12 Amt. JUR. CONTRACTS §153.
2 17 C. J. S. CONTRACTS §190.
3See, for example, those cited in PAGE, CONTRACTS §663 (2d ed. 1920), following
the statement: "The illegality or validity of a contract is to be determined by
its tendency as the parties make it and not by its actual results as the parties

perform it. If it can, by its terms, be performed lawfully, it will be treated
as legal, even if it is actually performed in an illegal manner
4 McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corporation, 147 N.Y.S. 2d 77 (1955).

The agent has been hired on contingent compensation to procure a contract
for his principal with a third party. This he succeeded in doing by bribing
an employee of the third party to grant the contract. The New York Court
allowed the agent to enforce his bargain although the bribery was contrary
to the Penal Law of New York.
5 Old Dominion Transport Co. v. Hamilton, 146 Va. 594, 131 S.E. 850, at 854
(1926).
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it will still be "treated as legal" or is not "made illegal." But the fundamental concept of the "broad rule" remains the same: If the contract was legal when made, illegal performance by the plaintiff is of
no consequence or effect.
II. EARLY DEVELOPMENT-NINETEENTH CENTURY
There are indications that the rule developed as early as 1834, but
the case cited, Favor v. Philbrick,7 is poor authority, for the court
not only failed to explicitly enunciate the "broad rule" but found no
illegal performance."
However, in the thoroughly considered English case of Lord Howden v. Simpson,9 Tindel, C. J., in allowing the plaintiff to enforce his
contract, stated:
"The quality of the agreement, whether fraudulent or not,
must depend upon the intention of the parties at the time of
making it; and if there does not then exist the intention of deceiving the legislature by concealing from it, whilst the petitioners were asking for one set of favors, the purpose of afterwards
asking for others, the agreement cannot be void, whatever imputation might rest on the conduct of the parties in making the
subsequent concealment."' 10
It is doubtful whether the issue of the effect of plaintiff's illegal
performance was ever raised in this case, because it appears that
plaintiff's side of the contract was fully performed when he withdrew
his opposition to the first bill, and his participation in any subsequent
concealment of the agreement from Parliament was gratuitous and not
really in performance of his promise."
6 17 Am. St. Rep. 501 (1834); See: Favor v. Philbrick, 7 N.H. 326 (1834).

N.H. 326 (1834).
8 The 1824 case of Davis v. Bank of England, 2 Bing. 393, 130 Eng. Rep. 357,
involving the right of a depositor to collect dividends due on stock owned
by him and held by the Bank, cited in support of the "broad rule" by counsel
in Powers v. Skinner, 34 Vt. 274 (1861), must also be distinguished, because
the court did not expressly state the "rule," and any illegal acts of the depositor were collateral to the contract and took place after performance of
the contract promise.
9 (Citation follows the chronoloical progression of the case through the English courts) : 1 Keen 583, 48 Eng. Rep. 432 (1837) ; 3 Myl. & Cr. 97, 40 Eng.
Rep. 862 (1837); 10 Ad. & El. 793, 113 Eng. Rep. 300 (1839); 9 Cl. & Fin.
6, 8 Eng. Rep. 338 (1842). The Lord was suing to recover on a contract
he had made with a railroad company whereby he would drop his opposition
to a bill authorizing a line through his estate in return for which the railroad
would pay compensation and after the enabling bill passed Parliament would
endeavor to pass a second bill authorizing diversion of the tracks in order
that they might not pass so near the Lord's mansion as they necessarily
would under the first bill. The parties, not wishing delay or complications
in an already delicate situation, did not tell Parliament of their intention to
strive for enactment of the second modifying bill as soon as the first was
passed.
10 Ibid.. 10 Ad. & E. 793, at 818. 113 Enz. Rep. 300, at 310.
"I See also Eastern Counties Ry. Co. v. Hawkes, 5 H. L. Cas. 331, 10 Eng. Rep.
928 (1855), wherein Lord Campbell, during counsels argument against the
77
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Although earlier cases may be found cited as authority, 12 the problem was not in fact considered in the United States until Powers
v. Skinner 13 in 1861 wherein the majority denied recovery, construing
the auditor's finding as "equivalent to an express finding that the contract, as understood by the parties, contemplated the use or exercise by
the plaintiff of his personal solicitations and influence with individual
members of the legislature in support of the application which he was
employed to favor and promote." 14 However, a dissenting opinion
stated that it was erroneous to hold that the auditor's finding established that the parties contemplated an illegal bargain; that the truth
was that there existed no illegal intent at the time of contracting, but
only illegal performance by plaintiff. In this situation the dissent was
of the opinion that recovery could not be denied plaintiff, and before
citing Lord Howden v. Simpson" as support, said:
"The defense has, in no degree, rested on the manner of the
performance by the plaintiff; nor has the decision of the court,
as I understand it; but exclusively on the quality of the contract
as made by the parties. This is the only tenable ground of defense." 6
It ought be noted that this statement of the law, which, it may be admitted, is expressive of the "broad rule," arises in a dissenting opinion
and relies for authority upon the English case of Lord Howden v.
Simpson, analyzed above.
The issue of the effect of illegal performance under a valid bargain was avoided in Brown v. Brown (1861) 17 where the court, after
conceding that the contract was not necessarily illegal on its face, admitted evidence of illegal "acts and proceedings under the contract
giving it a practical construction,""' and thus establishing an illegal intent at time of bargaining to justify its refusal to enforce.
In Russell v. Burton (1867)19 the court once again avoided discussion of the effect of illegal performance, holding that none but legal
validity of a contract, made the observation: '"Was the contract legal or illegal at the moment it was entered into? If it was legal, nothing happening
afterwards can affect it."
12In Harris v. Roof's Executors, 10 Barb. Ch. 489 (1851), cited as authority
in Chesebrough v. Conover, 140 N.Y. 382, 35 N.E. 633 (1893), the "rule" was
not stated, and the contract was illegal on its face.
In Sedg-wick v. Stanton, 14 N. Y. 289 (1856), also cited in Chesebrough,
and in Jenkens v. Hooker, 19 Barb Ch. 435 (1854), cited in Russell v. Burton, 66 Barb. Ch. 539 (1867), the "rule" was not stated, the contract was
entirely legal on its face, and the performance was legal.
"334 Vt. 274 (1861).
14 Ibid., at 283.
15 Supra, note 9.
16 Supra, note 3 at 284.
1734 Barb. Ch. 533 (1861).
Is Ibid., at 537.
1966 Barb., Ch. 539 (1867).

1957]

COMMENTS

services were stipulated for or contemplated by the parties. The
"broad rule" was not given by the court, and its authority is at best
indirect, on the reasoning that by refusing to consider the effect of
illegal acts in performance except insofar as they aided in establishing the intent of the parties at the time of contracting, the court was
inferentially holding that illegal performance will not effect recovery
on an otherwise valid bargain.
The first univocal and clearly expressed statement of the "broad
rule" occurred in the often-cited Massachussetts case of Barry v. Capen 20 in 1890, Holmes, J.:
"The Plaintiff may have rendered illegal services, and yet
the defendant's promise may have been in consideration of the
plaintiff's promising to perform or performing legal ones only.
If the contract was legal, it would not be made illegal' 2by misconduct on the part of the plaintiff in carrying it out." '

However, the court's admission that "what was done, moreover, was
not necessarily improper, even in the particulars mentioned," 22 would
appear to reduce its enunciation of the rule to obiter dicta, for the issue
of the effect of illegal performance could not be raised unless illegal
acts were in fact present.

23

The rule as given in Barry v. Capen was amended in Fox v. Rogers
(1898)24 by the qualification "not necessarily illegal." The plaintiff

was allowed recovery against a defense that could allege only incidental acts of illegaity, i.e., the drain pipes which plaintiff had provided,
the kind and type being left to his discretion by the contract, were
Akron earthenware pipes and not cast iron as required by law. 25
20

151 Mass. 99, 23 N.E. 735 (1890). Defendant had employed plaintiff to appear

before the street commissioners to advocate the laying out of a street through
his land and to secure compensation for the land so condemned. Plaintiff did
not draw the petition, was not present at the hearing, and "did not do some
other things which it might be supposed that one who really was engaged as
counsel would do ;" but before public proceedings were begun for laying out
the street, he went at least three times a week to see the street commissioners.
"At this time he was chairman of the Democratic city committee."
21 Ibid, 23 N.E. at 735.
22Ibid, 23 N.E. at 736.
23 Holmes cites as authority the English decision Lord Howden v. Simpson,
supra, note 9, and the dissent in Powers v. Skinner, supra, note 13.
24 171 Mass. 546, 50 N.E. 1041 (1898). Plaintiff sought the contract compensation after laying a drain pipe for defendant. Defense was that the pipes laid
differed from those permitted by statute and that certain other ordinances
had been violated. In rendering decision for plaintiff, the court said:
"We shall not trouble ourselves about the construction of the statute
and ordinances, because it does not follow that the plaintiff cannot recover if he broke them. There is no policy of the law against the plaintiff's recovery unless his contract was illegal and a contract is not necessarily illegal because it is carried out in an illegal way, Harry v.
Capan, 151 Mass. 99, at 100, 23 N.E. 735."
25 Other nineteenth century small cases cited as authority for the "broad rule"
are of no real value because the factual situation is not such that the issue
could be raised. The expressions are obiter dicta at best. Chiopewa Valley
and Southern R.R. Co. v. Chicago, St. Paul, Milwaukee, and Ohio R.R. Co.,
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III. THE DOCTRINE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The "broad rule" as developed and applied in this century has been
cited in cases falling under a number of different fact categories, 2
each of which must be considered in turn. The categories arise because
of the nature of the problem. The "broad rule" posits the presence of
three elemnts: first, a contract legal on its face at inception, because
if the contract as it arose were illegal by the intent of the parties or
its purpose, the matter is ended there, and there is no need to consider
the effect of any subsequent performance; second, illegal performance
of the legal contract through illegal acts that are basic and material
to the contract and its performance rather than incidental and trivial;
third, the "broad rule" given by the court as its reason for holding
that the illegal performance does not effect the contract, legal when
made.
1. Cases Wherein the Essential Elements Are Not All Present:
The impressively lengthy but inaccurate list of cases cited by Page
in support of his statement that "the illegality or validity of a contract
is to be determined by its tendency as the parties make it and not by
its actual results as the parties perform it. If it can, by its terms, be
performed lawfully, it will be treated as legal, even if it is actually
performed in an illegal manner," 27 contains three cases wherein two
of the three essential elements are missing. In these cases the contract
as made was legal both on its face and in fact, but the illegal acts
were collateral and incidental to the contract, and the "broad rule"
was not given. Thus, a paymaster was allowed to recover over $3000
for his contractual services even though on one occasion he had paid
some laborers by giving them $67.40 worth of liquor which was illegal
merchandise at the time and place. 28 Nor did subsequently resumed
illegal cohabitation between unmarried persons prevent enforcement
of a valid prior contract whereby the man promised that if the woman
would not institute bastardy proceedings against him, he would pro75 Wis. 224, 44 N.W. 17 (1889), cited in Chesebrough v. Conover, infra,
involved a contract illegal on its face, and Chesebrough v. Conover, 140
N.Y. 382, 35 N.E. 633 (1893) itself, cited in McConnell v. Commonwealth
Pictures Corp., 147 N.Y.S. 2d 77 (1955) saw no legal acts in the performance
of a legal contract.
26 Some cases and authors have even cited earlier cases as authority for application of the "broad rule" when the case in reference neither applied, there
being, in truth, no illegal acts present, nor stated the "rule" so generously
accredited to it. See: Van Tine v. Hilands, 131 Fed. 124 (1904), cited in
PAGE CONTRACTS §663 (2d ed. 1920) ; Ackerman v. Boyle, 236 Mich.
664, 211 N.W. 34 (1926), cited in 12 AM. JUR. CONTRACTS §153; Armstrong v.
Toler, 11 Wis. 258 (1826), cited in Dunham v. Hastings Pavement, 56 App.
Div. 244,67 N.Y.S. 632 (1900) and 57 App. Div. 426, 68 N.Y.S. 221 on rehearing
(1901) ; and Joseph v. Briant, 108 Ark. 171, 157 S.W. 136 (1913), cited in
McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 147 N.Y.S. 2d 77 (1955).
27 PAGE CONTRACTS §663 (2d ed. 1920).
28 Seid Chee v. Sanitary Fish Co., 103 Wash. 345, 174 Pac. 443 (1918).
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vide for her and the children. 20 And a third-party beneficiary was allowed to enforce the contract although the contracting parties subsequently engaged in additional criminal intercourse. 30 These cases, each
of which appears to be justly decided on its particular facts, are not
connected with nor authority for the "broad rule."
Cases in which the court finds that the contract was illegal from
the moment it was made, before any performance was begun, and
nevertheless quotes the "broad rule" must be regarded as furnishing
only obiter dicta and of little weight. 31 Equally useless as solid authority are those cases giving the "broad rule" when the contract was legal
when made and there existed no illegal acts in performance. 32 Some
courts have also quoted the "broad rule" with approval when the contract was legal when made and the question of any possible illegal
acts was not actually considered because the case was before the appellate court only on demurrer.33 These cases are at best indirect authority on the reasoning that in expounding the "broad rule" the court
is effectively instructing the trial court on how to handle the problem
if it should arise in the future on retrial.
2. Cases Wherein the Essential Elements Are All Apparently Present:
There do exist a number of cases which, after only a brief inspection, appear to offer firm support for the rule: A contract legal when
made, illegal performance, and the "broad rule" offered by the court
as its reason for holding the contract unaffected. However, closer
examination reveals that in all of them the acts constituting the illegal
performance are not basic and essential to the contract ,but of an incidental and collateral nature. The result is that the rule goes beyond
these cases and gives a univocal and exceptionless answer without ever
having been presented with the question of the effect of illegal performance upon a legal contract when the illegal acts are basic, funda29 Burton v. Belvin, 142 N.C. 151, 55 S.E. 71 (1906).
30
Doty's Admin. v. Doty's Guardian, 118 Ky. 204, 80 S.W. 803, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.)
713 (1904).
31 See: Drake v. Lauer, 93 App. Div. (N.Y.) 86, affirmed 182 N.Y. 533, 75
N.E. 1129 (1904); and Arlington Hotel Co. v. Ewing, 124 Tenn. 536, 138
S.W. 954, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 842 (1911), cited in 17 C.J.S., CONTRACTS §190.
32See: Stansell v. Roach, 147 Tenn. 183, 246 S.W. 520 (1923); Kelly v. Williams, 162 Ill. App. 571 (1911) ; Cochran v. Burdick, 63 App. D.C. 150 ,70 F.
2d 754 (1934), cert. den. 293 U.S. 561, 55 Sup. Ct. 73, 79 L. Ed. 661, cited in
17 C.J.S., CONTRACTS §190; Lewis v. Davis, 145 Tenn. 468, 199 S.W. 2d 146
(1947), cited in 12 Am. JuR-, CONTRACTS §153; Freeman v. Jergens, (Dist. Ct.
of Appeals, Calif.), 125 C.A. 2 578, 271 P.2d 210 (1954), cited in 17 C.J.S.,
CONTRACTS §190; Yazoo and Missippi Valley R. Co. v. Searles, 85 Miss. 520,
37 So. 939, 68 L.R.A. 715 (1905), cited in 12 Am. JUR., CONTRACTS §153; Traver
v. Naylor, 126 Or. 193, 268 Pac. 75 (1928).
33 Bush v. Russell, 180 Ala. 590, 61 So. 373 (1913); Kerr v. American Pneumatic Service Co., 188 Mass. 27, 73 N.E. 857 (1905) ; Hollister v. Ulvi, 199 Minn.
269, 271 N.W. 493 (1937).
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mental, and inhere in the very substance of the contract and its performance. 4
Included is the appearance of an Indiana attorney before the state
legislature to urge passage of a certain bill, an appearance which underthe circumstnces might have been illegal although the court is not
sure, and which was neither expressly nor by implication required in
his agreement with defendant. It was, essentially a waste of time rather
than performance, and the court could see no reason why it should
prevent recovery for the services when the attorney eventually com3 5
pleted his side of the bargain.

A New York decision of 190036 furnishes a good example of the
typical case under this group, in which the court virtually admits that
the allegedly illegal acts are so minor or collateral as to be beneath
consideration, but then, rather than rendering a decision limited to
the facts before it quotes the "broad rule." The court stated that plaintiff had "the right" to present the merits of a manufacturer's paving
materials to the mayor and said of his dealings with the aldermen that
37
there was "little basis for condemnation."
An agreement between a undisclosed agent and his principal whereby the agent was to return certain property, bailed to him, after completion of business dealings was not rendered illegal by subsequent
illegal manipulation of Federal taxes relating to the property when the
agreement did not contemplate such action, and it was not essential to
performance.38 Nor was the legality of the contract affected when the
illegal acts occurred in a "distinct transaction" which "can be separated
from the valid acts of the parties." 39 And an employee's right to recover under Workman's Compensation was not affected by the fact
that he was performing under the requisite contract of hire on Sunday,
40
which under statute made the performance illegal.
A number of cases in this group deal with the right of plaintiff
to recover on a contract legal when made but performed in a manner
violative of some statute. These decisions are dependent upon the
wording of the particular statute, its nature and purposes, and on the
34 As

was the case in the New York decision of McConnell v. Commonwealth
Pictures Corp., supra, note 4 ,where plaintiff's task was to obtain a contract
for his employer with another corporation. He performed by bribing the
agent of the other corporation to issue the contract and then sued for his
services, alleging that he had performed by obtaining the desired contract.
35 Hogston v. Bell, 185 Ind. 536, 112 N.E. 883 (1916).
36 Dunham v. Hastings Pavement Co., 56 App. Div. 244, 67 N.Y.S. 632 (1900),
rehearing 57 App. Div. 426. 68 N.Y.S. 221 (1901).
37 Ibid., 67 N.Y.S. 632, at 638.
3S Erminger v. Damel, Tex. Civ. App., 185 S.W. 2d 148 (1945).
39 Phend v. Midwest Engineering and Equipment Co., 93 Ind. App. 165, 177
N.E. 879 (1931).
40Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Tabor, 283 S.WN. 779 (1926),
Texas Com. App. For similar case see, Southern Underwriters v. Knight,
Tex. Civ. App., 107 S.W. 2d 1097 (1937).
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individual court's determination of the most just manner in which
to effect the declared public policy. Especially are the courts hesitant
to declare a contract unenforceable when the resulting hardship on
plaintiff would be gravely disproportionate to the penalty imposed by
41
the statute and the actual harm caused the public by its violation.
This attitude appears logical, for in almost all cases the violation entails
the performnce of an act which is not naturally unlawful or destructive of the pulic welfare and which at common law would not be
an illegal act. The courts tend to treat the regulatory statute as imposing its own penalty and not requiring in addition that the whole
contract be declared unenforceable, and in this sense the statutory violation may be termed incidental or collateral to the performance of
the contract. Thus, in performing a valid sales contract, plaintiff violated a State-of-Washington Statute by failing to mark the product
"renovated butter," but the contract was not invalidated. 42 Similarily,
the demolition and removal of a building,43 the installation of an oil
burner,44 and the repair of a building,45 all without required permits,
46
have not prevented plaintiff from enforcing the contract.

IV. THE OTHER SIDE
The inherent falacy of the "broad rule" in asserting its applicability in all cases of illegal performance of a legal contract without any
variance or distinction depending upon the kind and substantiallty of
the illegal acts has not gone unrecognized through the years, although
the flaw was not placed in bold relief until the McConnell decision in
1955. 7 Williston has stated his position :48
"It has been said that 'there is no policy of the law against the
plaintiff's recovery unless his contract was illegal, and a conSee: WILUSTON, CONTRACTS §1767:
"Where the illegality of work done or of materials furnished under
a contract is slight, or where judgment for the defendant will impose
a severe forfeiture upon the plaintiff, courts are astute to discover
ground for allowing the plaintiff to recover . . . In general, unless a
bargain necessary contemplates an illegal act, it is not unenforceable.
and if it is later performed in a way that involves some slight violation
of law, not seriously injurious to the public order, the person performing may recover on his bargain."
42 Armour v. Jesmer, 76 Wash. 475, 136 Pac. 689 (1913).
43 Gardiner v. Burket, 3 Cal. App. 2d 666, 40 P.2d 279 (1935).
44 Keith Furnace Co. v. Mac Vicar, 225 Ia. 246, 280 N.W. 496 (1938).
45 Comeaux v. Mann., Tex. Civ. App., 244 S.W. 2d 274 (1951).
46 For an example of the complex situation that can arise from concluding
prenuptial contracts within the restricting period following the prior divorce
of one of the parties, see Knollenberg v. Meyer, 151 Kan. 768, 100 P.2d 746
(1940) ; and Mitchell v. Clem, 295 Ill. 150, 128 N. E. 815 (1920). The Court's
enforcement of the prenuptial contracts would seem explainable on the more
narrow grounds that interpretation of the effect of a particular state statute
was involved and that any illegality was cured by reason of emergence of
a valid common law marriage after the restraining period had run.
47 McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 147 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1955).
48 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1761.
41
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tract is not necessarily illegal because it is carried out in an illegal way.' It is submitted that, if this statement is made as a general principle, it is unsound. The illegality of the plaintiff's conduct is the vital test, not only as shown by the character of the
contract itself, but by his acts in performing it. It is true that
not every illegal act in performing a contract will vitiate recovery; thus, if a carpenter in building a legal fence commits a trespass, this will not preclude recovery for the fence. But if the
performance actually rendered by the plaintiff is something in
itself forbidden by law, the fact that the bargain was in such
general terms as to cover either the illegal performance or a
lawful performance, and that both parties originally had no intention to have the performance unlawful, will surely not justify
recovery on the bargain if the illegality is serious or more than
an incidental part of the performance. An agent can recover no
commissions for negotiating a bargain or sale by illegal means,
though his contract with his principle did not specify the means
to be employed, and his case would not be helped by proving
that the principle or both the principle and he himself originally
expected legal means only would be employed."
In Old Dominion Transport Co. v. Hamilton 9 the above quotation
from Williston was approved, and the court stated that:
"On principle we are of opinion that there should be no recovery in cases where fraudulent devices were adopted or where
public policy is plainly violated. The reasons which lead to this
conclusion are more compelling when the action is for services
rendered and not on a contract performed . . . It is clear that

one cannot come into court and say, 'I have done an evil thing
for you; pay me for it.'

"

"It is equally clear... that incidental acts of illegality do not
render a lawful contract unlawful. There must be some attendant sinister suggestion that goes to the heart of the case." 5'
The Virginia Court then held that in the case before it the acts alleged against plaintiff by defendant were not necessarily illegal, but
granted that by plaintiff's own testimony there appeared admissions
which, if unexplained, would be extremely damaging and, accordingly,
remanded the case for new trial because the jury had not decided
"whether personal and political influences beyond such as were necessary and lawful were brought to bear when the matter [an attempt to
obtain by legislative action a pier lease then held by a competitor of
plaintiff's employer] was up for decision.

' 52

In previous discussion, examples of performance in violation of
statute have been examined and the point was made that the language
of the particular statute, the court's evaluation of the public policy
49 146 Va. 594, 131 S.E. 850 (1926).
5o Ibid., 131 S.E. 850, at 854.
51 Ibid., at 855.
52 Ibid., at 857.
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issue involved, and the nature of the prohibited act itself could lead
to the conclusion that vis a vis the promised performance the illegality was incidental and, therefore, that the facts of the case did not warrant so sweeping a generalization as the "broad rule." Without retreating from the position that in all cases involving statutory violations care must be exercised in evaluating the meaning and worth
as precedent of each decision, it may be observed that if the broad rule
were the correct one in its area (and if it were, it could be the only
rule, because its terms leave no room for others) in no case, regardless of the public policy question or seriousness of the breach, 3 could
voilation of a statute result in rendering a previously legal contract
unenforceable. But cases of exactly that type do exist. Anderson v.
Daniel,5 4 an English decision, arose because of plaintiff's failure to
state on the invoice, by percentages, the chemical composition of the
fertilizer sold. In denying plaintiff the right to maintain suit for the
price, the court said, Banks, L.J.:
"But Mr. Macaskie has contended that a contract cannot
be avoided for illegality except where it was void ab initio . . .
It has been said that in such a case the contract was perfectly
legal when made, and cannot be avoided by a subsequent omission to do some act which the statute requires to be done. I do
not think it is necessary to show that the contract was illegal ab
initio in order to avoid it; it is enough to show that the vendors
failed to perform it in the only way in which the statute allows
it to be performed." 55
Recovery has also been refused in cases involving~violation of a municipal ordinance in erecting an unapproved water tank,50 and of an
order of the Civilian Production Administration in erecting a house
57
without obtaining the necessary priorities for the materials used.
-9 Granted that the statute did not expressly make illegal all contracts performed
in violation of it.
541K.B. 138 (1924).
5 Ibid., at 144.
56 American T. and I. Co. v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 254 Ill. App. 514 (1929).
57 Tocci v. Tembo, 325 Mass. 707, 92 N.E.2d 254 (1950). It is interesting to note
that this is the same Massachusetts Court that was the first to tate the
"broad rule" in its presently quoted form-see: Barry v. Capen, supra, note
17 and Fox v. Rogers, supra, note 18. For a case similar to and which cites
T-cci v. Teinbo see Hawes Electric Co. v. Angell, 332 Mass. 190, 124 N.E.2d
257 (1955).
Apart from the question of statuory violations, the dicta in two California
cases suggests that the "broad rule" is but another way of stating that illegal
performance by one party does not render the contract illegal and unenforceable for all purposes; that the innocent party can still enforce it if
he so elects, but not the guilty party. Thus, in Teachout v. Bogy, 175 Cal.
48, 166 Pac. 319, at 322 (1917).
"Respondent further suggests, very briefly, the application of the principle that where a contract can be performed in a legal manner as well
as in an illegal manner, it will not be declared void because it was in
fact performed in an illegal manner ... But the principle just stated is
applied where the contract manifests no intent or purpose that it is to
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CONCLUSION

Reflection on the cases reveals how slight and unreliable is the
authority for the "broad rule." Mr. Holmes' pronouncement in Barry
v Capen5s has probably had the most decided influence upon many
later, often rather superficially reasoned, cases, but in his case Holmes
himself removed one of the essential requisites for application of the
"broad rule," i.e., illegal performance, by admitting that the acts were
not "necessarily improper" and further weakened the decision by citing
as authority an English case in which the illegal acts were not done
in performance of the contract, 9 and a dissenting opinion of a Vermont judge.60 The development of the rule in the Twentieth Century
inspires no more confidence. Many of the decisions that quote it do
not even involve the issue of illegal performance of a legal contract, 61
and the others deal with illegal acts which are incidental and collateral
to the promised performance rather than serious, substantial, and immediately concerned with the performance. 62
The components of the problem are simple: A legal contract and
illegal performance. The defendant contends that as a result of the
illegal nature of the performance the court should not lend its aid to
the plaintiff by assisting him in enforcing the bargain. By quoting the
"broad rule," the court replies that the illegality was in the performance rather than in the contracting, and in such a situation the illegality is of no consequence, does not affect the contract, and does not
prejudice the rights of the plaintiff.
Defendant's contention is based on the fact that an illegal contract
9
be performed in an illegal manner and where also the party complaining does not participate in, or cooperate with, the illegal performance.
In other words, the illegal intent or act of the party in default, not essential to a proper performance, will not vitiate the contract, so as to
affect the rights of the other party, who was guiltless of any participation or cooperation therein."
And in Vagim v. Brown, 63 Cal. App. 2d 504, 146 P.2d 923, at 927 (1944)
" .. .where a contract can be performed in a legal manner, as well as
in an illegal manner, it will not be declared void because it was in fact
performed in an illegal manner . . .This last principle stated is applied
where the contract manifests no intent or purpose that it is to be performed in an illegal manner and where also the party complaining does
not participate in, or cooperate with the illegal performance."
Similarily in 6 R.C.L. §100:
"Similarly if a contract is of a lawful character it is not rendered unlawful by the attempt of one of the parties to put it to an unlawful use,
or by his misconduct in carrying it out, though such misconduct would
no doubt affect his right to enforce the contract."
58 151 Mass. 99, 23 N.E. 735. See supra, note 20. The statement was: "If the
contract was legal, it would not be made illegal by misconduct on the part
of the plaintiff in carrying it out."
59 See Lord Howden v. Simpson, supra, note 9. See also supra, note 23.
60 See Powers v. Skinner, supra, note 13. See also supra, note 23.
61 See cases discussed under, 1. Cases Wherein the Essential Elements Are Not
All Present.
62See cases discussed under, 2. Cases Wherein the Essential Elements Are All
Apparently Present.
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is not enforceable; that if this illegality had been present in the contracting rather than in the performance, the plaintiff could not prevail in his suit. The "broad rule" in effect admits that if the illegality were in the contracting, plaintiff could not maintain suit, but says
that the same result does not follow when the illegality is in the
performance. This position is not only unsupported by authority and
contrary to the facts and decisions of the cases which have arisen in
the area, but falsely reasoned.
In the case of illegal contracts generally, the line of thought is
that the plaintiff cannot enforce the contract because his conduct has
rendered him a petitioner whom the courts will not aid. 3 If the courts
so regard him when he is responsible for the introduction of illegality
at the time when the promises are exchanged, why should their attitude be suddenly changed when he causes the illgality to be introduced
during performance, which may occur only a moment after the exchange of promises?
The basic reasoning of the correct approach to illegal contracts,
which states that the plaintiff cannot enforce his illegal bargain,
places its emphasis on the effect of the illegality on the plaintiff as a
person rather than on the contract itself considered as an entity apart
from its makers. Modern cases and authors often quote verbatim
from a decision of Lord Mansfield in 1775:64
"The objection, that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the
mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the
objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles
of policy, which the defendent has the advantage of, contrary to
the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff, by accident,
if I may say so. The principle of public policy is that; ex dolo
malo non oritur actio. No court will lend its aid to a man who
founds his cause of actio upon an immoral or an illegal act. If,
from the plaintiff's own stating or otherwise, the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa, or the transgression of a
63

RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS

§598 (1932).

"A party to an illegal bargain can neither recover damages for breach
thereof nor, by rescinding the bargain, recover the performance that
he has rendered thereunder of its value ...
"COMMENT:
a. The statement that all illegal bargains are void is not wholly accurate . . . When relief is denied it is because the plaintiff is a
wrongdoer, and to such a person the law denies relief. Courts do
not wish to aid a man who founds his cause of action upon his
own immoral or illegal act."
64Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (1775). See also: 17
C. J. S., CONTRACTS §272; 12 Am. JuR. CONTRACTS §209; RESTATEMIENT, CONTRACTS §598 (1932); WrILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1630; Oklahoma Portland Cement
Co. v. Pollock, 181 Okla. 266, 73 P. 2d 427 (1937) ; Gibbs & Sterrett Mfg. Co. v.
Brucker, 111 U.S. 597, 4 S.Ct. 572, 28 L. Ed. 534 (1884) ; Parish v. Schwartz,
344 Il. 563, 176 N.E. 757 (1931) ; Smith v. Smith, 255 Wis. 96, 38 N.W.2d 12
(1949).
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positive law of this country, there the court says he has no right
to be assisted. It is upon that ground the court goes; not for the
sake of the defendant, but because they will not lend their aid
to such a plaintiff. So, if the plaintiff and defendant were to
change sides, and the defendant was to bring his action against
the plaintiff the latter would then have the advantage of it; for
where6 5both are equally in fault, potior est conditio defendantis."

The Mansfield analysis finds its principal antagonist in the erroneous
and oft-discredited void contract theory 6 6 which, in stating that the
illegality renders the contract itself void, attempts to place the effect
of illegality in the contract rather than in the person. The "broad rule"
in dealing with illegality falls into precisely the same error as the
void contract theory. It makes an absolute distinction between the
contract and its performance and holds that because the illegality was
not found in the contract, it is of no effect, completely unmindful of
the fact that illegality acts primarily upon the person and not the
contract and that the same person both contracted and performed.
However, the fundamental error of the "broad rule" is its failure
to recognize that as a result of the illegal performance there is actually
an illegal contract, and therefore the usual rules applicable to illegal
contracts should apply, and there is no need for anything new and
different such as the "broad rule." Its conclusion depends upon its
distinction between the contract and its performance, but any such
distinction is in logic rather than in reality. A bilateral contract consists of an offer, acceptance, and consideration, which consideration
is not ultimately the promise itself, but the performance promised. As
performance is rendered, the contract becomes continuously more perfected until it is executed, on first one side and finally on both. As the
contract progresses from inception to execution, it is in a state in
which it is called executory, during which additional performance is
necessary to reach an executed condition, but it is the contract itself
as a whole that is in this state, and at any moment there exists in fact
but one contract, in various stages of development, although it is
65 Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, at 1121.
66 See cases and authorities cited in note 64, supra. Evidence of the fact that
illegality does not render the contract void is found in the existence of cases
wherein the innocent party to a contract to marry, made when the defendent
is already married, is able to maintain an action for breach of promise (A),
and in the unavailability to the party responsible for illegality of an action
for money had and received, which action would necessarily be present if
the contract were void.
Note: (A)
Hilbert v. Kundicoff, 204 Cal. 485, 266 Pac. 905 (1928)
Wallin v. Sutherland, 252 Wis. 149, 31 N.W.2d 178 (1948); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §599 (1932); 11 C.J.S. Breach of Mar-

riage Promise §2 f,

WILLISTON,

CONTRACTS

§1631.

Of course, express provision of statute may alter the situation and make
the contract itself void ab initio because of the illegality, but in the absence
of such express declaration, the effect of illegality is as outlined above.
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possible to separate in logic the bargain that arose when promises
were echanged from the performance of those promises. The court
which enunciates the "broad rule" refuses, like Zeno, 67 to recognize
the dynamic development that has taken place and now appears before
the court as the contract in issue. "The" contract of which such a court
speaks in the "broad rule" is no longer in existence; only the contract
before the court actually exists in fact, and it is composed inseparably
of offer, acceptance, the promises exchanged and the performance of
those promises insofar as such performance has been rendered. There
is only one contract, an illegal contract, and the plaintiff cannot en6
force it. s

All that is of worth and merit in the "broad rule" may be incorporated as a narrow part of the observation that an illegal contract
cannot, as a general rule, be enforced by a plaintiff responsible for the
illegality, and the situation is not altered by the fact that the illegality
appears in the performing rather than the contracting, provided only
that the illegal acts be serious and substantial and not incidental and
collateral.
CORNELIUS C. SHIELDS

67

Considering Zeno's attitude of mind as evidenced in his paradox that a man
cannot go from point A to point B because he must first travel half the

distance, and then half the remaining distance, and then again half the remaining distance, ad infinitum.
68 The correctness of this reasoning is even more immediately apparent in the
case of unilateral contracts, in which no contract at all exists until the requested performance is completed. Indeed, it appears that in the following
cases, variously cited as authority for the "broad rule," the contract might
well have been unilateral: Harris v. Roof's Executors, 10 Barb. Ch. 489
(1851); Jenkins v. Hooker, 19 Barb. Ch. 435 (1854); Sedgwick v. Stanton,
14 N.Y. 289 (1856) ; Powers v. Skinner, 34 Vt. 274 (1861) ; Russell v. Burton, 66 Barb. Ch. 539 (1867); Barry v. Capen, 151 Mass. 99, 23 N.E. 735
(1890); Fox v. Rogers, 171 Mass. 546, 50 N.E. 1041 (1898); Chesebrough
v. Conover, 140 N.Y. 382, 35 N.E. 633 (1893); Joseph v. Briant. 108 Ark.
171, 157 S.W. 136 (1913); Drake v. Laner, 93 App. Div. (N.Y.) 86, af-

firmed 182 N.Y. 533, 75 N.E. 1179 (1904); Arlington Hotel v. Ewing, 124
Tenn. 536, 138 S.W. 954 (1911); Stansell v. Roach, 147 Tenn. 183, 246 S.W.
520 (1923); Freeman v. Jergens, 125 Cal. App. 2d 578, 271 P.2d. 210; Bush
v. Russell, 180 Ala. 590, 61 So. 373 (1913) ; Hollister v. Ulvi, 199 Minn. 269,
271 N.W. 493 (1937); Hogston v. Bell, 185 Ind. 536, 112 N.E. 883 (1916);
Dunham v. Hastings Pavement Co., 56 App. Div. 244, 67 N.Y.S. 632 (1900);
and 57 App. Div. 426, 68 N.Y.S. 221 (Rehearing-1901).

